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Lessing tells us in an introductory preface that The
Golden Notebook breaks that form; it points to "all
that complexity" that the outer novel omits. In
this paper I have tried to indicate some of the
complexity which" academic writing" can edit
out.
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How can teacher education best prepare teachers
to contribute to values education in schools?
Ifthis was ever a question that could be asked and
answered in the abstract, or with reference to
some postulated ideal situation, it is not so now. I
am raising and suggesting an answer to the
question in the context of recent developments in
education in Britain; but since those recent
developments are by no means unique to Britain,
the discussion may well be of broader relevance
too.
The context, then, in which I am raising the
question is one of increasing political control, at a
national level, over both the curriculum of
schools, and the form and content of teacher
education itself. Several developments have
combined, in Britain, which make it difficult to be
optimistic about the future of any serious values
education in schools; but at the same time, some
opportunities have been opened up which could
be grasped by teacher educators.

When the National Curriculum for England and
Wales was first sketched out in 1987, one of the
many negative reactions to it was the thought that
it would involve little more than the transmission
of a predetermined syllabus in each of a defined
list of subjects; possibilities for pupils' own
involvement in their learning, for their
exploration of and critical reflection on matters
concerning their own lives - for, indeed, the whole
area which often goes under the label of Personal
and Social Education - looked distinctly limited.
Five years later, after many syllabus materials and
guidelines have appeared, there has been no lack
of reference to the need for pupils to engage with
questions of values; on the other hand, there are
indications that, at least in the view of
government, there is no need to take these
references too seriously.
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an~ because of the complexity in ,the way in
whIch both statutory provisions and guidelines
are arrived at. In some cases, syllabus proposals
which gave some emphasis to questions of values
(e.g. in the treatment of environmental questions
as they arise both in geography and in science)
have been watered down before reaching their
final statutory form; in other cases there was
never any intention that certain proposals should
have statutory status. At the time of the
Education Reform Act, 1988, a National
Curriculum Council (NCC) was set up, with a
remit to make recommendations concerning the
whole curriculum. Part of the NCe's activity has
been to recommend a set of cross-curricular
themes, and to issue guidelines for them. More
will be said about these themes below; but one
thing which they are held to have in common is
that they provide an opportunity for the
exploration of values and beliefs. The provision
of these cross-curricular themes within a school's
curriculum, however, is not required by law.

The position at the time of writing, then, is that a
pile of documents exists, within which quite
frequent references are made to value issues; but
how far the aspirations behind these references
will be realised in schools is quite another
question. It is also true that the aspiration that
questions of values should enter into the school
curriculum is often not made very specific.
Statements such as the following, from Guidance
documents on cross-curricular themes issued by
the NCC, are typical:
a. [Pupils should] 'Discuss moral values and
explore those held by different cultures and
groups' NCC document, Curriculum Guidance
5, Health Education, p. 16.
b. 'Schools should ensure, where relevant, that
there is a balanced presentation of opposing
views. Pupils should be encouraged to
explore values and beliefs, both their own and
those of others.' NCC document, Curriculum
GlIidance 4, EducatiOll for Economic and
Industrial Understanding, p. 3.

There has been room for such discrepancies to
arise because of the distinction between what is
statutory and what exists merely in guidelines;

Lessing, D. (1962). The Golden Notebook. London:
Paladin,1989.
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I shall set the context first in terms of the school
curriculum itself; then in terms of developments
in teacher education.

Gibbs, G. (1981). Teaching Students to Learn: A
Student-Centred Approach.
Milton
. Keynes: Open University Press.
Hodge, \R.
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c.

'Schools should consider how and when to
help pupils, between the ages of 5 and 16,
develop .... concern for human rights .... ' ibid.

p.5.
d. 'These aims will help to promote ....
knowledge of self - qualities, attitudes, values,
abilities, strengths, limitations, potential and
needs' NCC document, Curriculum Guidance 6,
Careers Education, p. 2.
There is little attempt to go into any more detail.
(In contrast, many of the documents, particularly
those setting out statutory requirements for the
mainstream subjects, have gone into considerable
detail about what is to be taught on a more factual
level.)
So far, then, the move towards a National
Curriculum for schools has resulted in what
might to be argued to be little more than gestures
towards the importance of dealing with values
within the school curriculum.
One measure of how seriously a commitment
towards any form of values education is taken
might be the extent to which teachers are to be
trained to deal with questions of values in their
teaching. Here again, so far as central initiatives
are concerned there has been little more than a
paper acknowledgement of the issues, and even
that appears, at the time of writing, to be due for
further dilution. For the past few years, a set of
criteria for the accreditation of courses of teacher
education (via CATE, the Council for the
Accreditation of Teacher Education) has been in
force.
These criteria are rather like the
requirements of the National Curriculum itself, in
that the need for teachers to deal with questions
of values is recognised, but is not given great
weight or much specification. On completion of
their course, the criteria state, students should be
able to incorporate in their teaching crosscurricular dimensions (e.g. equal opportunities,
multicultural education and personal and social
education); and they should be able to teach
controversial issues in a balanced way (DES
Circular 24/89:
Initial Teacher Training:
Approval of Courses).
It was always the case that in trying to meet these
aims in the preparation of teachers, institutions
would be labouring under pressure of time and of
many other competing aims. More recently it
appears that attempts to prepare teachers to
engage in any serious values education will be
still more severely constrained. On both sides of
the political spectrum there is agreement that a

8
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higher proportion of teacher training than has
been the case should be carried out in schools; for
the present Conservative government, the
Secretary of State for Education has announced
(January 1992) that this proportion should be
80%. The primary intention is that teachers
should be as well prepared as possible in the
competences of classroom teaching, which is
assumed to be in their subject specialism; an
inevitable side-effect, whether intended or not, is
that there will be less time available for any
studies which are aimed at giving teachers either
a more theoretical or even simply a broader basis
for their work. Consistently with this, it is no
surprise that new criteria for teacher training are
to be produced which will say still less, if
anything at all, about teacher's responsibilities
and capacities in the area of values education.
Perhaps one lesson that can be drawn from
current trends is that, if there is to be a place in
teacher education for an input from specialists
who are not themselves classroom teachers, that
role will not be primarily in equipping teachers
with classroom competences. Politically the
decision appears to have been made that this is
the role of the schools. In the limited time
available in any course of teacher education, a
specialist input would do well to concentrate on
something which otherwise would not
provided at all.
The current British context, then, in terms both
curriculum and of teacher education, does
encourage optimism about values education in
schools. Yet this is in a wider context in which
both politicians and members of the public
often suggest that schools are partly ,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,oi
for what are seen as the moral ills
society.
Schools may be seen as doing too little for
moral and civic development of their pupils;
the 1988 Education Reform Act itself required
the school curriculum must 'promote
spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and ph
development of pupils at the school and
society'. It would see that a heavy burden is
being placed on teachers, of a responsibility for
the moral good of their pupils and the s
which extends far beyond their competence as
teachers of their subject; but that, on current
trends, the education of teachers will include less
and less preparation for this role.

11
To repeat, what can teacher education do to
prepare teachers to play at least some worthwhile
part in values education? I shall suggest that, on

certain conceptions of values education, there is
in fact very little that can be done; but that there is
another, and very important, aspect of values
education which does offer more hope.
Much that has been written on values education,
more specifically under the heading of 'moral
education', has been concerned with the
development of a range of dispositions and
competences on the part of individuals. There
have been approaches which see moral education
primarily as the teaching of a certain form of
reasoning (associated, for instance, with the name
of John Wilson in Britain and with Lawrence
Kohlberg in the USA, though Kohlberg hims~lf
preferred to speak of 'cognitive stimulation'
rather than teaching). The intention of such
approaches has been to equip individuals to make
their own moral judgements, in a way that is both
autonomous
and
rational,
without
predetermining what judgements they would
make. Such approaches have been criticised, and
more recently the tide seems to be turning
towards an approach which, often referring to
Aristotle, emphasises that what most of all have
to be developed are appropriate dispositions that
are as much emotional as cognitive - in short,
virtues.
Neither of these approaches seems at present to
offer a realistic possibility for values education in
schools of a form which teachers could be trained
to deliver. The more 'rationalist' or 'cognitive'
approach does, certainly, hold out the possibility
of systematic programmes of education in moral
reasoning being worked out, and if there were
such a systematic programme, teachers could be
trained to teach it.
But (leaving aside
philosophical
questions
about
the
appropriateness of such an approach), the
development of the National Curriculum has so
much concentrated attention on the teaching of a
(rather traditional) list of core subjects that the
insertion of what would be virtually a new subject
is not for the foreseeable future a realistic option.
The problem with the 'development of virtues'
approach is different: even supposing there were
general agreement on the qualities to be
developed, we have too little idea of how to go
about promoting such development. Perhaps
there is no systematic programme that could be
developed; surely a lot must depend on home'
environment and peer group relationships; and in
so far as a child's moral development in this sense
depends on teachers at all, it may be a matter of
the example a teacher sets. The effect of example
may not itself be predictable, but may depend on
some little understood interaction between the
Vol. 17, No. 1,1992

characteristics of a particular teacher and
particular child. Whether teachers can be trained,
or even selected, to be moral exemplars is very
doubtful; and if there were a form of initial
teacher education that would have predictable
success in turning out teachers of good moral
character, it would surely have to be different
from the current courses which concentrate
almost wholly on instilling certain competences.
In the present context, then, whatever can be done
by way of preparing teachers to contribute to
values education, will have to be done in a way
that can be fitted in to the primary political
concern of preparing teachers to deliver a set
curriculum. But there is a possibility that builds
on that primary concern.
Even if the
development of moral qualities in individuals is
something which the education system as
presently constituted can hardly tackle in any
deliberate way at all, there is another aspect of
values education, which depends on recognising
the extent to which values, especially in a
complex and pluralist society, are both subject
matter and ingredient of public debate. At
present much public debate on matters of values
hardly goes beyond the level of assertion and
coun ter-assertion;
ra tionally-demons tra ted
positions,
reasoned
consensus,
and
understanding of the positions of others are all
less in evidence than they might be. I think it will
hardly be disputed (and is not out of line with the
professed aims of the Education Reform Act) that
to enable citizens of a democratic and pluralist
society to engage in a reasoned way on debate
about value issues which are of public importance
could be a proper educational aim. And,
fortunately, it is not unrealistic to think that
teachers can be enabled to make a positive
contribution in this area.
It will be helpful here to give some examples of
the sorts of issue I have in mind. As it happens,
within the context of recent curriculum
developments in Britain, such issues come up
often within the cross-curricular themes already
mentioned. That is not to say that they come up
only here; but anyone concerned with values
education has pragmatic reason for building on
what is already to hand. (A principle that could
apply in other countries, though the illustration I
go on to give is specific to recent British
developments.) The cross-curricular themes are
to hand and do have official recognition, even
though not statutory force. It will be useful, then,
to list some of the questions of values which are
already recognised in this context, under the
headings of the cross-curricular themes in which
they come up.
9
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Economic and Industrial Understanding
One topic recognised under these theme is the
distribution of wealth. In a national, a European
and a world context it will become clear to pupils
that there are great disparities in the material
conditions of life. This raises questions about
justice, both within a society and between nations.
Is a situation in which some people have more
than others automatically unjust?
What
determines whether a situation is just or unjust?
Environmental Education
Many of the NC documents on particular subjects
have anticipated the idea of environmental
education as a cross-curricular theme; as one
would expect, the documents on science,
technology and geography are well aware of
environmental issues.
Often, one finds a
reference to environmental consequences and
factors which have to be considered in addition to
others, including ethical ones (for some reason the
term 'ethical' is commoner than 'moral'). But this
is misleading in its suggestion that environmental
questions do not already contain questions of
values. Here is one deep and central one: Are all
of the moral questions about how we are to treat
the environment questions about how other
human beings, both now and in the future, will be
affected? Or are the effects on non-human
animals also morally relevant? And further, are
effects on the non-sentient environment morally
relevant in their own right? Can there be
anything wrong in irreversibly altering the natural
environment, when effects on sentient beings are
put on one side?
Citizenship
Here it seems hardly necessary to demonstrate
that moral issues are raised. Let me take just one
or two examples involving the political activity of
voting. Should citizens see voting or not voting
as a matter simply of individual preference, or
should they consider themselves to have a duty to
vote (this being a question of moral duty in a
country such as Britain where there is no legal
compulsion to vote)? And when they do vote,
should each voter see her decision in terms of
what will be best for herself, or in terms of what
will be best for the society as a whole - or indeed
for a still wider community? That is an issue
about a political process; but any issue of public
moral concern is presumably relevant to the
theme of citizenship.

10
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Health Education; Careers Education and
Guidance
These remaining two cross-curricular themes
from the NCe's list are at first sight different, in
that they are less concerned with public moral
issues and more with individual choice. For the
most part the underlying thinking behind the
NCC guidance on these themes seems to be that
pupils should be enabled to make their own
informed choices. I say 'for the most
because there are some matters where it is taken
to be the school's responsibility to promote a
particular substantive value, beyond, that is, the
value to the individual of making her own
choices, e.g. from the Health Education guidance,
'The principal objective of family life education is
that pupils understand and value the central role
of the family as an institution' (p. 4). But for
most part the emphasis is on individual choice.
This does not mean, however, that such choice is
to take place without moral parameters, or
the parameters are not debatable. There are,
instance, possible choices of lifestyle which
predictably will call down moral disapprobation
from at least some quarters; and questions
the way in which one individual who would
make a certain choice for herself is to
another who does make that choice, e.g. to take
example which could well come up under the sex
education aspect of health education, how is
person to view the choice of another to go in
prostitution? Is that activity to be viewed as
legitimate part of a free-market pr,em,nIT'
hence a legitimate choice - given suitable
precautions? Notice here that what can be
as a question of individual choice can also
as a question of public morality. And on
more generally, is it morally indifferent
an individual chooses to earn a living: in one
the health care professions; in the production
marketing of some rather useless but
profitable luxury consumer goods; in
manufacture of armaments; as a soldier?
In these examples, which could readily
multiplied, we have a considerable variety
questions, so far as their subject matter
concerned, but they all involve moral questions
or if it is reckoned in a particular case that
moral issue is raised, that will itself be ueUdllau"
I submit that a rational exploration of
this context, must involve considering
across differences in subject matter. It is
plausible, either in the thought of one rlhrirll1al;'
or across society, that values come
compartments that happen to coincide with
categorisations made by the NCC - one set

values where health is concerned, another where
the environment is concerned, etc. But if rational
comparisons are to be made, it seems there must
be some common currency in which this can be
done - some kind of common vocabulary or
conceptual scheme which cuts across differences
in subject matter.
Consider the comparison with the rather
traditional National Curriculum foundation
subjects. To teach a subject to the point where
rational discussion can go on within it is, to quite
an extent, to teach a language or a set of concepts.
Of course, in geography, history, the sciences etc.
there is a good deal of information to be
assimilated, but the information, if it is to be made
use of in a geographical, historical etc. context,
will be framed within some recognisable
vocabulary which will be to a degree a specialist
one. (A point not neglected by the expert
committees charged with drawing up syllabuses,
even if it has been missed by some politicians.) I
want to ask whether there is a common currency
for discussion of values.
Readers of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) might well
return a negative answer. At the beginning of
After Virtue he cites some familiar examples of
moral disagreement within our culture - about
abortion, the use of nuclear weapons, the justice
of redistributive economic policies (notice, by the
way, that each of these could well arise in the
context of one or other of the cross-curricular
themes). MacIntyre says that because conflicting
positions on these issues are not ones that fall
within a single moral tradition, there is no
rational way of resolving them. The disputes
arise because different traditions - or fragments of
traditions - clash, and there is no common ground
to which protagonists of different positions can
appeal.
Should we conclude that there is no future for
rational discussion of moral issues in schools? I
think not, even if MacIntyre is right. MacIntyre
claims that our culture has no way of reaching a
rational resolution of these disputes - in other
words there can be, within our culture, no right
answer. But the aim in an educational context
does not have to be to arrive at a right answer. In
that sense I would certainly not claim that
discussion of moral values will ever be like school
mathematics. There could be an aim of trying to
arrive at a working agreement for practical
purposes, but that would be a further
development, which I have explored elsewhere
(Haydon, G., 1986); my argument here does not
depend on it. For the moment my question is
Vol. 17, No. 1,1992

simply whether there can be a common language
in which moral values can be explored and
discussed.
In the case of history, geography, science and the
rest, if we can speak of a common language of
discourse it is because we can refer to alongstanding well established practice. In the case of
issues of values we do have such a long-standing
well-established practice, and it would be foolish
to ignore what it can offer. The practice, and the
language, are those of moral and political
philosophy. The picking out of philosophy here,
m preference to other academic traditions which
do also have things to say about values, is
deliberate. One could look instead to theology,
but any particular theological tradition will rest
on presuppositions which are too substantive to
furnish a language in which the range of value
positions in
multi-faith culture could be
compared and debated. Sociology has a lot to say
by way of explaining why people in particular
groups tend to hold the values they do; but in an
educational context an exploration of why people
hold their different values, while it might in itself
be illuminating, would be only a starting point for
an exploration of the values themselves.
Psychology has a lot to offer too, but much of the
psychology of moral values has taken a
developmental line which will be more relevant
where development of individual capacities and
dispositions is the aim than where the concern is
a rational investigation and comparison of
competing standpoints.
Take Kohlberg's
developmental scheme, for instance. If we wish
people to be able to have serious debate about
their values, the ability to categorise certain
positions as being at, say, Stage 3 and others as
Stage 4, is at worst invidious and at best
irrelevant.
No doubt there is more to be said about the
resources offered by alternative academic fields of
enquiry, but let me now say something positive in
favour of philosophy. MacIntyre is right, of
course, that there are very different traditions
reflected within moral and political philosophy.
But the point is that philosophy itself gives us a
language within which to talk about the
differences. I would suggest that some of the
most well-worn distinctions are still some of the
most useful.
Let me look back at my earlier examples. First I
mentioned questions about justice, both within a
society and between societies. A lot of recent
moral philosophy has pretty thoroughly explored
various approaches to justice - appeals to utility,
11
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to rights, to hypothetical contract. MacIntyre is
quite right to point out that the positions of Rawls
and Nozick are a kind of formalisation of
positions that are found in popular consciousness
(After Virtue, ch. 17). What I want to add is that to
be able to see current differences over
re distributive justice in terms of the
Rawls/Nozick debate - to mention just one
debate that is relevant - while it certainly doesn't
bring one closer to a 'right answer', does take one
a long step towards clarifying the differences and
seeing them for what they are.
I mentioned then values issues concerning the
environment. Fundamental here, I think, is the
question whether the only intelligible values are,
in the end, human centred. If they are, or even if
they are centred more widely on sentient
inhabitants of the Earth, then in an environmental
context a large step has already been taken
towards a utilitarian ethic. If the relevant values
are not solely anthropocentric, what basis is there
for them? There is scope here for the exploration
of theologically based positions of various kinds;
and also for the idea that environmental concerns
somehow demand a radically new kind of ethic
(on which I would suggest that until we have
some informed acquaintance with existing
varieties of ethical outlook, we are in no position
to recognise whether something new is needed).
On citizenship, it will perhaps not need spelling
out that once one tries to explore very far a whole
range of value issues concerning the relation
between the individual, the society and the state,
one will soon come to questions about appeals to
utility or appeals to rights, and to concerns of a
more Aristotelian or communitarian kind - all of
them very much already in the arena in our
culture, even if not always recognised under this
terminology.
I said that both in Health Education and Careers
Education the idea of individual choice loomed
large. If choice is to be informed, it can be
informed not only by factual information but also
by understanding of the sorts of value perspective
which can be seen to bear on the choice. (Without
this understanding, the emphasis on choice can
seem to support a radical subjectivism about
values which undermines the possibility of
serious public debate.) The utilitarian tradition,
which has been influential on the legislation of
liberal societies, holds that the only reason for
condemnation of a practice which an individual
might wish to choose is the prevention of harm to
others. There is also a strong strand in liberal
theory which puts great weight on consent. From

12
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the point of view of both these traditions, there
may be no moral objection at all to practices
which involve only consenting adults and bring
about no harm to others - though if there is a
danger of harm to the consenting adUlts
themselves, the traditions may diverge on the
degree of paternalism countenanced. But of
course an exploration of values must include the
exploration of values which are not rooted in an
utilitarian and liberal tradition, and must be able
to talk about the moral objections which
people do feel to, say, prostitution
homosexuality (separately or together). Within
philosophical literature there is scope, for
instance, for exploring the idea that certain
practices are unnatural - what is to count as
natural? (a question which also arises from a
different perspective within environmental
concerns). And what of the idea of respect for
persons? Is the Kantian idea that a person must
be respected, which involves never treating him
or her solely as a means, congruent with the idea
that it doesn't matter what you do to a person so
long as he or she consents? In the context of
career choice, what of the related Kantian idea
that one has a duty to develop one's talents? How
much restriction does this put on the utilitarianliberal idea that individual preference is
paramount? And what again of the idea that the
full flourishing of human beings, in their working
activity as well as in their leisure, lies in the social
nature of human beings, so that doing a job, or a
certain sort of job, may in part constitute a
person's identity and membership of a
community, rather than being simply a means
towards independent ends?
My suggestion is, then, that the Western tradition
of moral and political philosophy contains a rich
store of ideas, concepts and arguments which can
help to make sense of and bring some order into
the 'exploration of values'. But just how, if it is
right, can this argument be of help in educational
practice? Am I suggesting that all school pupils
should be educated in moral and political
philosophy?
There is a case that could be made for that, but it
would be hard to convince people of it at a time
when the National Curriculum itself has put so
much pressure on people's time and energy in
delivering what has to be delivered. Certainly
schools, in considering how to deliver adequately
on the cross-curricular themes, could usefully
consider the possibility of devoting some time
with students, even if only 40 minutes a week in
certain years, to a directly focused and
deliberately cross-curricular look at values. But
Vol. 17 No.}, 1992

even that modest proposal would need teachers
able to handle it in a productive way. And
teachers and their own preparation are the focus
of concern here. NCC documents constantly refer
to the need for cross-curricular planning if the
whole curriculum is to be successful. So, we have
to envisage that teachers whose own base is in the
sciences, history, maths, English, etc. sit down
together to see where and how certain ideas are to
be got across and considered. Among these
concerns will be - or should be - values. It is at
this stage, most of all, that a common currency of
debate would surely be valuable. What prospect
will there be of pupils doing anything more than
engaging in an exchange of personal points of
view - without further examination and reflection
- if teachers themselves do not have the language
in which they can recognise the kinds of views
that are being brought forward; see where there
are links that can be made with issues that might
come up in some quite different part of the
curriculum; and see where there are lines of
approach which are important with the society
even though they might happen to be missed
within the particular composition of a class?
Does this mean a training in moral and political
philosophy for all teachers? Again, there could be
a strong case for that, but in the present climate is
over-ambitious. There is no need to aim at
equipping every teacher to consider all the
arguments put forward by professional
philosophers and to come to his or her own value
position on every issue. But there is a more
modest aim which should not be impracticable:
to introduce teachers to the kind of language and
conceptual systems which I have been referring
to, to the point where teachers are able to use this
language in their own curriculum planning and,
where appropriate, in their teaching. This would
perhaps best be done, not in distinct courses, but
in the process of equipping teachers to handle the
ki~d: of value issues which will come up both
wIthm the teaching of their own subjects and in
their contribution to the teaching of crosscurricular themes. Teachers preparing to teach
different subjects can be brought together during
their initial training, to work out how these crosssubject areas of the curriculum could be handled.
!hi~ n~ed not happen within separate training
InstItutIons; there would be a lot to be said for its
taking place in schools. But wherever the
location, people would be needed with the
relevant knowledge and experience who could
show student teachers that there is a systematic
Way of approaching the value issues which arise,
so that they are not left to have to rely on their
Own background assumptions or whatever they
Vol. 17, No. 1,1992

may have picked up during their own education.
Here, if anywhere, is a matter on which theorists _
even if they are closer to philosophy than to the
classroom - have an irreplaceable contribution to
make. This is not an element of the education of
teachers which existing classroom practitioners
can supply, since it has, in almost all cases, been
lacking from the education of those practitioners
themselves.
In a published lecture, MacIntyre (1987) has asked
whether there could in modern conditions be an
educated public, and concluded that there could
not. Given his definition of an educated public,
he was quite right; for him an educated public
would have to share - as a result of their
education - a single moral-philosophical tradition
(utilitarianism, say, or Catholicism) which would
set the parameters of their debate on public
issues. But in a less demanding and more realistic
- though still ambitious - sense, perhaps we need
not yet give up on the idea of an educated public
as a public sharing a political and civic culture in
which value issues would be debated - and they
would always remain debatable - in terms of a
shared understanding of what the issues are and
a shared vocabulary for dealing with them. And
teachers would actually be the bearers of this
common culture. That seems to me a worthwhile
vision. And though there has been little detail
about the content of teacher education in this
paper, the conclusion is inescapable that if there is
any prospect of bringing that vision into contact
~ith present-d~y reality - the reality which
mcludes the NatIOnal Curriculum and any likely
dev~lopments from it - that prospect will only be
realIsed through teacher education.
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